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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Zoe R. Barham appeals from the district court's restitution order to Progressive Insurance
("Progressive") after the jury found her guilty of insurance fraud. She argues the district court
abused its discretion by ordering her to pay restitution to Progressive for its investigation costs.
Therefore, she respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's restitution order in part
and remand this case to the district court to remove the investigation costs from its order.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
According to the probable cause affidavit, in January 2017, Ms. Barham purchased an
auto insurance policy from Progressive after her car hit another car, but she told Progressive that
she purchased the policy before the accident. (R., p.15.) After Progressive's investigation, it
denied the other car owner's claim because it determined Ms. Barham obtained the policy after
the accident. (R., p.15.) Progressive referred the claim to Idaho Department of Insurance
("IDOI") for a fraud investigation. (R., p.15.) In July 2018, the State filed a Criminal Complaint
alleging Ms. Barham committed one count of insurance fraud, in violation ofl.C. § 41-293(1)(c),
for providing a false statement to Progressive. (R., pp.12-13.)
The magistrate held a preliminary hearing, and a Progressive employee testified.
(R., pp.43--49.) After the hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offense and bound
Ms. Barham over to district court. (R., pp.49, 50.) The State filed an Information charging
Ms. Barham with one count of insurance fraud. (R., pp.54-55.)
Ms. Barham pled not guilty and went to trial. (R., pp.64, 111--44.) The Progressive
employee testified again. (See R., pp.112-20.) The jury found Ms. Barham guilty. (R., pp.144,
177.)
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Before sentencing, the State moved for restitution to IDOi and Progressive. (R., pp.17981.) Relevant here, the State requested $2,400.60 for Progressive for its employee's investigation
costs and travel expenses for the preliminary hearing and trial. (R., pp.179-81.) The State
included an affidavit from an IDOi fraud investigator that stated Progressive incurred $144.66 in
investigation costs and $2,255.94 in travel expenses. (R., pp.182-83.) Attached to the affidavit
were two documents from Progressive, one stating that the employee's six hours of investigation
cost $144.66, and the other detailing the employee's travel expenses. (R., pp.209, 210-17.)
At sentencing, Ms. Barham had no objection to IDOi's investigation costs. (Tr. Vol. I, 1
p.17, Ls.13-23.) She objected, however, to the restitution for Progressive and requested a
hearing. (Tr. Vol. I, p.17, L.24-p.18, L.3.) The district court ordered restitution to IDOi and
agreed to set a hearing for Progressive's restitution. (Tr. Vol. I, p.23, Ls.4-9; R., pp.234-24
(IDOi restitution order).) The district court sentenced Ms. Barham to five years, with two years
fixed, suspended her sentence, and placed her on probation for three years. (Tr. Vol. I, p.21,
Ls.18-23; see also R., p.219.) The district court entered the judgment of conviction in May 2019.
(R., pp.224-27.)
In June 2019, the State filed an affidavit from the Progressive employee that stated:
I, Philip Carey, being first duly sworn, state that I am an employee with
[Progressive], and attest that Progressive incurred the following expenses and
losses as a result Zoe Barham's criminal offense:
Progressive expenses:
1

The electronic document on appeal titled "Trascripts- Appeal Volume 1 9-12-2019 13.23.9
28449721 3089131B-0157-437B-A555-FECE724A35A8.pdf' contains three transcripts: the
preliminary hearing (pages 1 to 58 of overall document), sentencing hearing (pages 59 to 95),
and restitution hearing (pages 96 to 114.) However, each transcript contains its own internal
pagination. Citations to "Tr. Vol. I" will refer to the transcript of sentencing hearing and
reference the transcript's internal pagination. Citations to "Tr. Vol. II" will refer to the transcript
of the restitution hearing and reference its internal pagination as well. The preliminary hearing
transcript is not cited herein.
2

Travel Expenses Preliminary Hearing

$1,266.73

Travel Expense Jury Trial

$989.21

Investigation Costs

$144.66

Total expense

$2,400.60

(R., pp.238-39.) Attached to the affidavit were the same two documents from Progressive with
the employee's investigation costs and travel expenses. (R., pp.240-48.)
In early July 2019, the district court held a restitution hearing. (R., pp.253-54.) Upon the
State's request, the district court accepted the Progressive employee's affidavit. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7,
Ls.5-8.) The State argued Progressive was entitled to restitution to investigation costs and travel
expenses under the insurance fraud restitution statutes. (Tr. Vol. II, p.7, L.16-p.8, L.20.) The
State also argued Progressive's expenses were the actual and proximate cause of Ms. Barham's
criminal activity. (Tr. Vol. II, p.8, L.21-p.11, L.16.) Ms. Barham argued against both
investigation costs and travel expenses. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.11, L.19-p.15, L.6.) For investigation
costs, Ms. Barham asserted those costs were not financial losses because Progressive would have
to pay its employee regardless of his time spent on Ms. Barham's case. (Tr. Vol. II, p.12, L.16p.13, L.2.) The State agreed that Progressive would have paid its employee regardless, but
argued "those six hours could have been spent on other matters" if Ms. Barham had not
committed the offense. (Tr. Vol. II, p.16, Ls.13-22.) The district court took the matter under
advisement. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, L.25-p.18, L.1.)
On July 24, 2019, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order on
Progressive's restitution request. (R., pp.255-58.) The district court determined Ms. Barham's
criminal conduct was the actual and proximate cause of Progressive's investigation costs and
travel expenses. (R., p.258.) The district court explained: "It is foreseeable that when one
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commits a crime, the state will call witnesses to prove the crime. That is what happened here.
Progressive incurred investigative and travel expenses and should be reimbursed for the same."
(R., p.258.) The district court also determined substantial and competent evidence supported the
restitution request. (R., p.258.) Therefore, the district court denied Ms. Barham's objections and
ordered her to pay $2,400.60 to Progressive. (R., pp.258-59.) On July 30, 2019, the district court
entered an order for restitution to Progressive, and Ms. Barham filed a notice of appeal later that
day. (R., pp.260-61, 262-64.)

4

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Ms. Barham to pay restitution to
Progressive for its investigation costs?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Ms. Barham To Pay Restitution To
Progressive For Its Investigation Costs
A.

Introduction
Ms. Barham asserts the district court abused its discretion by ordering her to pay $144.66

in restitution to Progressive for its investigation costs. She contends the insurance fraud statutes
do not allow restitution for investigation costs because those costs do not meet the statutory
requirement of "financial loss sustained as a result of the violation." Therefore, Ms. Barham
argues the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards by awarding
restitution to Progressive for its investigation costs. She respectfully requests this Court vacate
the district court's restitution order for Progressive in part and remand for a new restitution order.

B.

Standard Of Review
To review an alleged abuse of discretion, the Court considers whether the district court:

"(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason." Lunneborg v. My Fun Life,
163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The last three considerations "require the district court to 'base the
amount of restitution upon the preponderance of evidence submitted by the prosecutor,
defendant, victim, or presentence investigator."' State v. Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700
(2017) (quoting State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170 (Ct. App. 2014)). "The district court's
factual findings with regard to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011) (citing State v. Lombard, 149
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Idaho 819, 822 (Ct. App. 2010)). "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law this Court
reviews de novo." State v. Smalley, 164 Idaho 780, 783 (2019).
C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Legal Standards Because The
Insurance Fraud Statutes Do Not Allow Restitution For Progressive's Investigation Costs
Two statutory provisions govern restitution in insurance fraud cases. The first provision,

contained in statute criminalizing insurance fraud, states in relevant part: "Any violator of this
section is guilty of a felony ... and shall be ordered to make restitution to the insurer or any
other person for any financial loss sustained as a result of a violation of this section." I.C. § 41293(4) (emphasis added). The second provision defines "financial loss": "'Financial loss'
includes, but is not limited to, loss of earnings, out-of-pocket and other expenses, repair and
replacement costs and claims payments." LC. § 41-291(8). Ms. Barham asserts the district
court's restitution order was in error because Progressive' s investigation costs were not a
"financial loss sustained as a result of the violation."
"Statutory interpretation begins with the statute's plain language. This Court considers
the statute as a whole, and gives words their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings." State v.
Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 3 (2015) (citation omitted). "A statute is ambiguous where the language is
capable of more than one reasonable construction. Only where the language is ambiguous will
this Court look to rules of construction for guidance and consider the reasonableness of proposed
interpretations." State v. Kraly, 164 Idaho 67, 70 (2018) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, Progressive's investigation costs do not fit the plain language meaning of "financial
loss." Idaho Code § 41-291(8)'s definition of financial loss contemplates reimbursement for the
insurer's payment of the fraudulent claim or other payments, such as repair or replacement costs,
to fulfill or resolve the false claim. LC. § 41-291. It also includes loss of earnings and out-ofpocket or other expenses. Progressive's compensation to its employees, however, is not a
7

"financial loss" "as a result of' Ms. Barham's false statement. Progressive's compensation to its
employees occurs notwithstanding the particular claim subject to investigation, and thus
Progressive does not suffer any financial loss from the violation by paying its employees to do
their jobs. Thus, employee compensation does not fit within the statutory definition of "financial
loss."
Relatedly, there is no actual cause between Ms. Barham's false statement and
Progressive's "loss," i.e., its compensation to its employee to investigation the claim. Like the
general restitution statute, the insurance fraud restitution statute has a causation requirement: the
loss must be "sustained as a result of the violation." LC. § 41-293(4). See LC. § 19-5304(2)
(general restitution statute requiring restitution for "any crime which results in an economic loss
to the victim"); Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602 ("[I]n order for restitution to be appropriate, there must
be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries
suffered by the victim."). "Actual cause refers to whether "a particular event produced a
particular consequence" and is a 'but for' test." State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 284 (Ct. App.
2014) (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2009)). Here, Ms. Barham's false statement
did not produce the consequence of Progressive paying its employee to investigate the claim
because, again, Progressive would have paid its employee anyway. In other words, it cannot be
said that, but for Ms. Barham's claim, Progressive would not have had to pay its employee.
Therefore, Ms. Barham's false statement was not the actual cause of Progressive's compensation
to its employee.
Finally, if "financial loss" is ambiguous, this Court should apply "the maxim noscitur a

sociis, which means 'a word is known by the company it keeps."' State v. Schulz, 151 Idaho 863,
867 (2011) (quoting State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000)). "Financial loss" is
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defined by terms referring to expenses or payments resulting directly from the criminal conduct,
such as the insurer paying a false claim. The definition is silent on investigation or prosecution
costs after the violation. This silence notably contrasts with other restitution statutes that
expressly include such costs. See I.C. § 41-295(6) (investigation costs for the IDOI in insurance
fraud causes); see also I.C. § 37-2732(k) (investigation and prosecution costs in drug cases).
Accordingly, if "financial loss" is ambiguous, this Court should exclude an insurer's
investigation costs as part of its loss from the violation.
In summary, Progressive's compensation for its employee's six hours of work to
investigate Ms. Barham's claim is not a "financial loss sustained as a result of the violation."
Ms. Barham maintains the district court did not apply the correct legal standards by ordering her
to pay $144.66 in restitution to Progressive.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Barham respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court's restitution order
for Progressive in part and remand this case for a new restitution order without $144.66 to
Progressive for investigation costs.
DATED this 19th day ofNovember, 2019.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of November, 2019, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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